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1 Introduction
Anecdotal evidence and a quick look at employment statistics suggest large differences in
group outcomes as measured by the accumulation of skills, earnings and employment rates.
This phenomenon is prevalent and persistent across developed economies. Field evidence
and wage decomposition exercises alike support these observations (Riach and Rich 2002).
Broadly speaking there are two explanations for the large group discrepancies in labor
market participation and employment rates. The first view holds that the labor market is
essentially free of racial stereotyping, instead the cause can be traced back to differences in
”initial conditions”, that is differences in pre-market factors valued by the market(Neal and
Johnson 1996). Proponents of the second view hold that ethnic stereotyping is persistent
and substantial in the market. When differential treatment of identical agents is present
in a market, the decisions of economic agents will be distorted. In the context of the
labor market such distortions affect the incentives to apply for jobs and to invest in human
capital (Coate and Loury 1993, Lundberg and Startz 1983). While differential treatment
may be efficient if informational asymmetries are severe (Norman 2003), the distribution
of income in such a society will be characterized by inequality. The policy implications
from these two views are radically different. The former view implies that scarce resources
should be directed towards correcting inequalities in pre-market conditions, whereas the
second view focuses on market regulation.
The present study contributes to this debate by providing evidence from a field ex-
periment conducted in the public sector of a major Dutch city1. The experiment was a
policy experiment designed to test the efficacy of anonymous application procedures. The
main ingredient of such a procedure is to hide group membership from recruiters at the
initial stage of application, that is the stage where recruiters decide whom to interview.
Although the policy evaluation is of separate interest in itself, more importantly we observe
outcomes for both stages of the application process, namely first the selection of the pool
of candidates invited for interview, and secondly those candidates who receive a job offer.
The experiment has a classic control/treatment design. In the control group recruitment
procedures are unchanged2. Recruiters in the control group base their interview decision
1The context and institutional background is described in section 3.
2Recruiters in the control group were aware that there was an experiment, see section 3.2.
1
on their assessment of a resume and an accompanying letter. In the treatment group the
experimental manipulation consists of removing information from the application package
that is perceived to be markers of group membership (such as name and email address.
See section 3.2 for details). Recruiters who are treated make interview decisions under a
(partial) veil of ignorance. By comparing the decisions made in the control and treatment
group we can quantify the role of group membership in the interview decision.
The experimental manipulation used in this field experiment differs from other field
experiments designed to detect differential treatment in the labor market. Two other
designs have prominence in the literature: audit and correspondence studies. In audit
studies the experimenter trains/instructs actors to attend job interviews. The actors are
matched on observable characteristics, except the group marker. A comparison of (net-
)success rates then allows for a measure of differential treatment. The main concerns raised
in the literature regarding this research design centers around the presence of experimenter
effects, and whether the two candidates used look identical (apart from group membership)
in the eyes of the recruiter. The advantage of the audit design is that it allows for the
possibility to observe the job offer decision. Correspondence studies3 make a different trade-
off. At the cost of focusing on the interview decision only, they gain additional experimental
control. In particular correspondence studies rely on sending fictitious resumes in response
to job openings. Group membership is randomly assigned to a resume and pairs of resumes
are then sent in response to job openings. The measure of differential treatment is then
based on differences in the (net) call back rate.
While correspondence studies retain substantial experimental control, they are prone
to the critique that in equilibrium minority members will not send applications to discrim-
inating employers. Therefore these studies tend to overestimate the extent of differential
treatment present in the market (Heckman 1998). The present study avoids this problem.
We observe all applications submitted by market actors in a specific local labor market
over a 6 month period. In addition the fact that the experimental design has a classic
control/treatment element allow us to rule out a number of competing explanations for the
differential treatment we observe.
In our study as opposed to audit and correspondence studies the pool of applicants
3See e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) for a recent field experiment utilizing this research design.
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is the population of interest. Also our measure of discrimination can be interpreted as a
measure of (local) market discrimination that is discrimination at the margin. Since we
observe all applications in a local labor market its is reasonable to expect that market
actors have internalized any differential treatment in their (costly) search decision. An
additional advantage is that we have data for the second stage where job offers are made.
We find robust and statistically significant evidence for differential treatment based on
group membership in call back rates. The estimates are economically meaningful. For
an applicant with average characteristics this amounts to a majority applicant having to
send around 6 applications to land an interview whereas her minority counterpart needs
to send roughly 13 applications. These results are in line with the findings of Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2004), who use a correspondence methodology, for the US of a racial
gap of 50%. An interesting question remains whether these large differences translate into
different offer rates? One interpretation of the differential treatment we observe is that
minority workers face tougher standards. Conditional on making it to the interview stage
we would thus expect the pool of minority workers to be better qualified than the workers
in the majority pool. Indeed our estimates suggest that once at the interview stage the
minority worker faces positive differential treatment (although this effect is not statistically
significant). We do not find statistically significant evidence for differential treatment based
on ethnicity in the unconditional offer rates, although our point estimates suggest a small
advantage bestowed upon majority workers.
These findings are interesting for several reasons. First, we credibly estimate a large
group gap in the call back rate. While we are not the first to do so, the methodology of the
experiment allow us to partially side step critiques based on market sorting. Indeed since
we observe all ”attempts to trade” we would expect sorting to have already taken place.
Second the experimental setup allow us to rule out a number of possible explanations for the
differential treatment. Since we cannot condition on all information contained in the CV’s
and application letters a genuine concern is that the group marker is correlated with some
variable that the recruiter observes and which is directly related to productivity, but this
variable is not available to the econometrician4. The experimental setup allow us to rule out
that such an omitted variable is the driver of our findings. Indeed in the treatment where
4Essentially explanations relying on omitted variable bias (Heckman 1998).
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recruiters cannot see the group marker we find no evidence of differential treatment. Third,
an advantage of giving up the experimental control of e.g. a correspondence study is that we
are able to look beyond the call back stage. One of the most interesting conclusions from our
study is that while there is significant differential treatment at the call back stage, group
membership is not important in explaining the unconditional offer decision. Significant
discrimination in the call back rates may be consistent with no discrimination at the offer
stage. From this observation one cannot draw the conclusion that differential treatment
at the call back stage has no economic effects. Indeed the incentive to acquire skills will
be distorted. Moreover minority workers will have to search more than their majority
counterparts to land an interview. This suggests important distortions between the two
groups e.g. in the time between jobs. Finally, this paper contains the evaluation of a policy
which aims to remove differential treatment at the call back stage. A few other papers
exist (which we review in the next section) but these studies tend to suffer from selection
effects, mainly because in these studies recruiters choose whether to participate, and in
what role they would participate (as control or treatment). Since our study covers the full
labor market for local public sector jobs, the participation decision is exogenously imposed.
Also recruiters do not themselves choose whether to be in control or treatment. In addition
the design minimizes applicant selection effects. It is not announced which departments
are assigned to control or treatment, although the experiment itself is announced. We find
that no differential treatment can be detected when operating under the policy, as such
the primary aim of the policy: to remove any differential treatment, is successful.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related evidence in
more detail. Section 3 describes the experimental setting and the design of the experiment.
In section 4 we describe and analyze the data. Section 5 discusses related evidence from a
follow up experiment. Finally section 6 concludes.
2 Related Evidence
There is a relative large literature exploring group differences in labor market outcomes.
The literature has been particularly interested in differences based on gender and ”race”
(Altonji and Blank 1999). Two research methodologies are used to identify and quantify
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group differences: observational and experimental studies.
Observational studies typically utilize large administrative data sources to quantify
groups differences in outcomes5. For US data large and persistent differences in earnings,
the so called racial wage gap, have been found. While few disputes these differences, the
literature differs on the cause. One strand of the literature attribute these differences to
group differences in pre-market productivity related factors (Neal and Johnson 1996)6;
the other strand argues that differences can be traced back to discriminating recruiters.
The latter studies frequently make use of experimental methods to assess the extent of
discriminatory practices at one or more layers of the recruitment process.
Experimental studies fall in two categories: audit and correspondence studies. In audit
studies the experimenter trains two actors from different ethnic groups. Actors are chosen
to be similar on all observable characteristics to allow for a ”ceteris paribus” comparison.
This methodology has revealed substantial net racial discrimination (Riach and Rich 2002).
A potential problem with audit studies, apart from the significant costs needed to get a
sufficiently large data set, is that the actors are informed about the nature of the study.
Thus although employers are not aware that an experiment is ongoing, the measure of
discrimination could be affected by experimenter effects, e.g. actors may consciously or
sub-consciously try to confirm the experimenters conviction. An additional issue is what
is actually measured. The discrimination measure is typically the average discrimination
(averaged over employers) per audit pair. An overall measure of discrimination is then
computed by averaging over pairs. The sample average may not be the population average
of interest.
Correspondence studies avoid experimenter effects by relying on fictitious applicants7.
Similar resumes are constructed and the experimenter manipulates the racial markers of
5A common approach to quantify group differences, is a racial dummy in an Oaxaca wage decomposition.
However other approaches are used in this tradition. E.g. in the context of the Swedish labor market
Eriksson and Lagerstro¨m (2007) uses a large internet-based database of resumes of the Swedish Public
Employment Office. Marrying this data with administrative data they find that minority membership is
correlated with a fewer number of approaches by employers and a fewer number of offers.
6Neal and Johnson (1996) cleverly circumvent the endogeneity problem that all observational studies
must ”solve”, and instead ask how much of the racial gap can be explained by pre-market initial conditions
only, as measured by AFQT tests.
7This method was pioneered by UK sociologists to measure the extent of labor market discrimination.
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the resumes. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) uses this methodology in their study of
labor market discrimination in Chicago and Boston. In response to help wanted ads they
send fictitious resumes. Since group membership is typically not included in an application
they instead use ”stereotypical” African-American and White names in the experimental
manipulation. They find large and statistically significant differences in call back rates.
The African-American marker results in a 50% lower callback rate compared to the White
marker. Our findings for call back rates match these findings. In a European setting
Carlsson and Rooth (2007) used correspondence testing to investigate discrimination in
the Swedish labor market. They use a similar manipulation to that of Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan (2004): they randomly assigned native and Middle-Eastern ”sounding” names
to fictitious resumes and sent them in response to help wanted ads in Gothenburg and
Stockholm. They find a 10% lower callback rate for the minority group, matching the
findings of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) of a call back rate which is 50% lower for
minorities8.
A drawback of correspondence studies is that market transactions are never consum-
mated, indeed since there are no real applicants the measure of differential treatment is
the (net) difference in call back rates. The question of interest may not be whether the
interview decision is distorted, but rather whether as a result of facing a lower chance of
landing an interview minority candidates also have a lower chance of receiving job offers.
By construction a correspondence study cannot address this issue. Our study speaks to
this question. Indeed we find statistically significant large effects of race on the call back
rate, but we only find weak evidence of differential treatment based on group membership
in unconditional offers. This is consistent with a selection procedure with tougher initial
standards for minorities and reverse discrimination at the interview stage (conditional offer
rates).
This paper also contains an evaluation of a policy specifically aimed at addressing unequal
treatment in job applications. The policy seeks to achieve this goal by concealing the group
8Carlsson and Rooth (2008) includes three groups: natives, native workers with Middle-Eastern sound-
ing names and Middle-Eastern immigrant workers. They find a 17% lower callback rate for native appli-
cants with a Middle-Eastern sounding name and a 21% lower callback rate for the immigrated applicants
compared with native applicants. They conclude that the foreign name of an applicant explains 77% of
the discrimination by employers.
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membership at the initial stage of application.
Goldin and Rouse (2000) uses variation in the use of screens in auditioning for large
symphony orchestras in the US to test for the efficacy anonymous application procedures.
They are interested in the question whether the chances of females to progress increase
when screens are used. They find that the use of screens increase a female’s chance of
progressing by 50%. In addition the use of screens in the preliminary round also increases
the likelihood that a female applicant wins the final by 30% (the final round is typically
not blind).
Closer to our setting A˚slund and Skans (2007) perform a field experiment on the use of
anonymous application procedures in the public sector of 3 districts in the city of Gothen-
burg, Sweden. In the treatment group both ethnicity and gender was hidden from re-
cruiters. They find evidence of differential treatment of non-western immigrant and female
applicants at both the interview and the offer stage. Non-western immigrants have a 8.9%
lower probability to be invited for an interview and a 2.1% lower probability to be hired.
For women the probability to be invited for an interview is 6% lower and the probabil-
ity to be hired is 3.8% lower. The anonymous job application procedure increases both
the probability of immigrants and women to be invited for an interview by approximately
8%. The hiring probability for females increase by 7%, but no such effect is found for
immigrants. The experimental procedures of A˚slund and Skans (2007) differ from ours in
several important aspects. The three districts in their sample are recruited among all city
districts. In addition districts are allowed to self-select into control (comparison) or treat-
ment. This affects interpretation of their estimates. Job ads for vacancies in the treatment
group indicate that an experiment is in progress and in addition to submitting a normal
application applicants must fill in a special application form which does not contain in-
formation on gender and ethnicity. Recruiters in the treatment group make their decision
based on the special form only, and only after a decision has been made do they receive
the full application package. A complication arises here since recruiters in comparison and
treatment groups do not have access to the same information over and above ethnicity
and gender variables. In addition the announcement that a vacancy was in the treatment
group raises concerns about possible applicant selection effects. Our experimental design
avoids these potential problems.
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3 Experimental Design
3.1 Setting and Institutional Background
The Netherlands is a small open economy with approximately 16 million inhabitants. The
Netherlands is and has been ethnically mixed for an extended period of the modern era.
In addition in the late post-war period there was a significant inflow of labor migration
to the Netherlands. The Netherlands remains one of the most ethnically mixed European
countries. Roughly 80% of the Dutch population is ethnically Dutch9. The largest non-
western immigrant groups are composed of Dutch Indonesians10, Turks, Surinamese and
Moroccans (each group is approximate 2% of the total population).
In spite of a long history of integration survey evidence suggests that discrimination
and stereotyping is not uncommon, both in the population at large and among recruiters.
Surveys of the attitudes of the Dutch population towards minorities (Scheepers, Eisinga,
and Linssen 1994, Verberk, Scheepers, and Felling 2002) find that 20% have strong negative
stereotypes, and 48% have ”subtle” negative stereotypes about immigrants. Unsurprisingly
these negative stereotypes about minorities can also be found among employers. Kruisber-
gen and Veld (2002) survey employer attitudes towards young immigrant workers. They
find that 6% of employers would never fill a vacancy with an immigrant worker, 18% would
only hire an immigrant worker if no native worker applies.
More direct evidence on differential treatment comes from correspondence and audit
studies. Bovenkerk, Gras, Ramsoedh, Dankoor, and Havelaar (1995) used audit tests
to assess the extent of discrimination against males of Moroccan and Surinamese origin.
For both groups significant levels of net discrimination in the call back rate was identified
(bearing in mind that these are not direct measures of market discrimination). Their study
show a minimum net rate of discrimination during the first phase of the job assignment
process of 32% for low educated male applicants of Moroccan origin and a rate of 40%
for the same group of applicants from Surinamese origin. Using correspondence tests the
authors find that highly educated male applicants of Surinamese face a minimum net rate
of discrimination of 18%.
9For comparison the UK has approximately 90% white majority.
10This group is considered to be western immigrants in official statistics.
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The findings for the labor market stand in contrast to Article 1 of the Dutch Constitution
which asserts equal treatment of its citizens. Perhaps for this reason several Dutch cities
have been willing to experiment with job assignment procedures which attempt to ensure
equal treatment of equally qualified candidates. Cities including Amsterdam, Nijmegen
and The Hague have experimented with versions of anonymous applications procedures
(AAP).
The Dutch city where this field experiment was conducted is in the top 10 of Dutch
cities as measured by population size. The composition of the city population is close to the
Dutch average. In 2007 8.3% of the population were of non-western origin, compared with
a national average of 10.3%. The largest non-western immigrant groups are Turks (24.3%),
Antillians (10.7%), Surinames (10.7%), Former-Yugoslavia (8.6%) and Moroccans (6.9%)11.
In 2007 the unemployment rate in the council was low (5.9% for 2006/2008 compared with
7.1% for 2005/2007)12. This is in line with the general trend in unemployment rates for
the Netherlands in that period13.
3.2 Experimental Procedures
In July 2006 the city council and the mayor approved the experiment with anonymous ap-
plication procedures. The experiment ran for a 6 month period from August 1st 2006 until
February 1st 2007. During this period all new vacancies were included in the experimental
sample either as control or treatment. In the taxonomy of Harrison and List (2004) this
experiment is a framed field experiment. The recruiters who participate in the experiment
take on the roles that they normally have. If assigned to treatment not all information
that is normally available to recruiters is present, but the task itself, that of scrutinizing
application letters and resumes and deciding who to interview is familiar to recruiters. The
second stage of the applicant screening, the interview, is not affected by the experiment.
In particular recruiters from departments that are assigned to treatment also meet face-to-
face with candidates at the interview stage. For an overview of the application procedure
11Source: Dutch Statistical Agency (CBS). http://www.cbs.nl.
12Source: http:\www.cbs.nl.
13Unemployment rates for the Netherlands as a whole was 5.5% (2006), 4.5% (2007) and 3.8% (2008).
In 2007 and 2008 the unemployment rate was considered to be below the natural rate of unemployment
by the CBS.
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and the experimental intervention see figure 1.
Experimental Intervention
Application
Record Information
Treatment? Remove Group Info
Forward to Recruiter
Interview? Offer? Notify Candidate
Notify Candidate Notify Candidate
No
No No
Yes
Yes Yes
Figure 1: Job Application Procedure. Experimental Intervention in dashed box.
Experimental Assignment The local public administration consists of 7 departments.
Each department is assigned to either control or treatment for the duration of the exper-
iment14. It is important to stress that the assignment to treatment or control was not
random, rather it was decided administratively. The decision was exogenous to participat-
ing departments, but as indicated below the joint characteristics of the two groups were
matched. The experiment designers made the decision whether a particular department
should be assigned to control or treatment. The only objective for assignment to either
treatment or control was to get two groups that were comparable in size in terms of to-
tal employment and in fraction of non-western immigrants employed. After experimental
assignment the treatment (control) group consisted of a group of departments with 1055
(909) employees, and an immigrant stock of 6% (9%). We stress at this point that it is
crucial for the interpretation of our results that departments cannot themselves influence
14The 7 different departments were: ”Stadsbedrijven” (Public enterprizes), ”Grondgebied” (Territory),
”Wijk en Stad” (District and City), ”Inwoners” (Resident services), ”Bestuursstaf” (Groups Staff), ”Con-
cernstaf” (Administrative Staff), ”Brandweer” (Fire department). The first 3 departments were assigned
to the treatment group, while the remaining 4 departments were assigned to the control group.
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whether they are in treatment or control15.
Posting of Vacancies and Informational Setting During the experimental period
vacancies were posted through normal job channels. Job advertisements did not mention
that an experiment was in progress. However the experiment did receive press coverage,
both in local radio, tv and newspapers16. Therefore we cannot exclude that applicants were
aware that an experiment was in progress. Importantly it was not made public whether
a department had been assigned to treatment or control. The experimental design allows
us to exclude applicant selection effects as a possible driver of our results. Such effects
would be present if an applicant’s decision on whether to apply for a position depended
on her knowledge of whether the vacancy was in control or treatment. We cannot rule out
that the public announcement of an experiment has affected the sample on the extensive
margin. That is the public announcement may crowd in applicants who would not otherwise
apply, perhaps due to the belief that differential treatment is prevalent in the application
procedure.
Processing of Applications An application consists of a letter and a resume. During
the experimental period all applications for vacancies goes directly to a working unit who
processes the applications and encodes information. The task of the unit is essentially
twofold: (1) Note down information about applicants and vacancies, including classifying
applicants into minority status or not (see below), (2) Process applications for vacancies
in the treatment group.
The unit collects the information about the applicants. This information consists of
gender, age, educational level, and whether the candidate is an external candidate or not.
Importantly the perceived minority status of the candidate has to be determined. Whether
the candidate has minority status or not is typically not revealed directly in the application.
Furthermore the mapping between having official minority status and the perception of such
is not one-to-one17. Instead for the purpose of the experiment an applicant has minority
15To be precise our estimates would still be meaningful but only as e.g. an intention-to-treat population
estimator.
16For instance the experiment was mentioned in an article in the national newspaper NRC-
Handelsblad on 25th January 2006 http://archief.nrc.nl/?modus=l&text=anoniem+solliciteren+
nijmegen&hit=6&set=2&check=Y.
17Applications do not typically list e.g. nationality or place of birth which is typically used by adminis-
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status if s/he has a non-western foreign ”sounding” last name. Thus e.g. applicants with
a German, French or English last name are not classified as having minority status. This
classification differs from the classification applied both by Dutch Authorities and the
Dutch Statistical Agency (CBS)18. Applicants are not asked to self-identity rather a team
of 3 independent testers determines whether the name is foreign ”sounding” in the sense
described above.
In addition the two outcome variables are collected. That is whether or not the can-
didate is invited to attend a job interview, and if so whether a job offer is made following
the interview.
The team also collects summary information about the vacancy. The following infor-
mation is collected: job title, announced educational requirements, whether vacancy is
permanent or temporary, date of vacancy and whether the vacancy is in control or treat-
ment19.
Whether applications are manipulated further before recruiters have a chance to look
at the applications depends on whether the vacancy is in the treatment or the control
group. If the application is in the control group the application is forwarded ”as is” to
the relevant recruiters. On the other hand if the application is in the treatment group
then the following steps are undertaken before the application is forwarded to recruiters.
Information on name, email address, birthplace, country or origin and nationality of the
applicant is ”tippexed” (whitened out). Only after this manipulation has been completed
is the application forwarded to the relevant recruiters.
The next step in the application procedure for a vacancy is the ranking of the set of
submitted applications. This step is identical for vacancies in the control and treatment
group, except for the fact that some information has been whitened out for applicants
to vacancies in the treatment group. Recruiters make a decision on whom to interview
(typically more than one candidate is called for an interview, see table 2). After compiling
their ranking of candidates, recruiters then communicate their decision to the experimental
unit who contacts candidates. Once at the interview stage there is no interaction between
trative bodies as the basis for ethnic classification.
18The classification is similar to the one used in the correspondence study of Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2004).
19Information about which department had the vacancy was not recorded.
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the experimental work unit and the recruiters apart from taking note of the outcome of
the interviews. To be clear once at the interview stage there is no experimental interven-
tion taking place; the experimental manipulation is only indirect through the selection of
candidates.
3.3 Comments on Experimental Setup
At first look the ideal experimental setup randomly assigns each vacancy to either control
or treatment. This would allow the analyst to average out vacancy specific effects. For
practical reason such a setup was not feasible. Instead in our analysis we shall take account
of vacancy specific effects. A more fundamental reservation against the ”ideal” experimen-
tal setup is the following. Suppose that recruiters harbor belief-based negative stereotypes
against the minority, while in reality a minority applicant is equally qualified viz-a-viz her
majority counterpart. Such beliefs may lead the recruiter to abstain from further scrutiniz-
ing minority applicants. Since under normal recruitment procedures the recruiter seldom
encounters a qualified minority applicant, she can harbor these stereotypes. However by
being exposed to minority applicants (as she would very likely be under an anonymous
application procedure) the recruiter may gain new information about applicant qualifica-
tions and update her beliefs accordingly. If recruiters adapt their hiring procedures fairly
fast to this new information the proposed ”ideal” experimental procedure which random-
izes within-departmental vacancies could fail to detect discrimination although present
and accordingly would also conclude that the anonymous application procedures policies
is unnecessary.
3.4 Potential Confounds
Applicant Margin Although the city council itself did not undertake considerable specific
efforts to make the experiment known to all potential applicants, the fact that such a
large scale experiment was about to be put into place naturally received attention in the
local press. Although we do not have access to data that would allow us to quantify an
effect of the ”announcement” we cannot exclude that applicants react to this information.
Applicants on the margin may have been crowded either in or out of the experimental
sample. A majority marginal candidate (marginal to applying that is) who expects to
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benefit from standard recruitment practices may choose to abstain from applying when
s/he is aware that there is approximately 50% chance that the vacancy is in the treatment
group. Symmetrically the announcement may crowd in applications on the margin from
minority workers who expect equal treatment if the vacancy is in the treatment group.
A related concern is that our estimates may be affected by applicant selection effects.
Such an effect would be present if applicants sort into vacancies depending on whether they
are in the treatment or the control group. Our estimates are not affected by this effect.
First, job adverts did not mention that there was an experiment in place20. Second, and
more importantly it was never made public which departments were assigned to treatment
and which to control. Therefore by design we can exclude applicant selection effects.
Recruiter Margin Recruiters whether assigned to treatment or control were aware that
there was an experiment21.
Two well known experimental effects may thus affect the interpretation of our esti-
mates. A well known experimental effect is the John Henry effect. This experimental
effect suggest that subjects assigned to the control group would work harder at behaving
like the treatment group. This would tend to bias our measure of differential treatment
downwards22.
A second potential experimental effect is the Hawthorne effect. This effect suggest that
any change in the environment of agents improve their behavior (in the direction of the
principals goals). The presence of this effect would suggest that our measure of differen-
tial treatment would be biased downwards. Indeed in this experiment the mere fact that
the principal clearly signals something about her objective function would suggest that
recruiters work harder at applying standards which do not depend on group membership.
If the Hawthorne effect is present in our study we would therefore expect it to bias our
estimates downwards. It may be argued that the treatment group received more atten-
tion than the control group, and that the effect of an anonymous application procedure
20As opposed to other experimental studies in this class applicants were not asked to fill out additional
forms declaring minority status, etc.
21We return to this issue in section 5.
22Post-experimental surveys and interviews with recruiters were also conducted. According to these
interviews recruiters believed that they did not treat applications differently depending on the ethnicity
of the applicant.
14
would vanish over time. It may be that ”tippexing” the most salient group membership
information is not sufficient to hide the ethnic identity of the applicant. E.g. recruiters
may use clues from the letter style or the residence of the applicant to deduce her ethnic
identity. It could affect the long run efficacy of anonymous application procedures as it
was implemented in the present study. If the Hawthorne effect is present, we may surmise
that after anonymous application procedures are implemented across the board, and exper-
imental ”attention” vanishes, then clues would again become salient. This concern, does
not affect, however, the extent of differential treatment as measured by the experiment.
4 Empirical Analysis
This section contains our main empirical results. We first provide a summary overlook of
our sample and then we proceed to estimation. Finally we explore whether the experimental
design allow us to shed any light on which type of differential treatment is at work in our
data.
4.1 Data
The data generating process for the data used in this study is as follows. Each application
sent for a vacancy generates a data point. For each data point the information disclosed
to us fall in three categories23: (1) applicant covariates, (2) vacancy covariates and (3)
outcome variables. The applicant covariates includes: age category (broken down in three
categories: below 30 years of age, between 30 and 45 years of age, and above 45 years of age),
educational attainment of candidate (grouped into low, middle and high), gender of the
applicant, whether applicant is an internal or external candidate and group membership of
the candidate (based on the method of classification outlined in section 3.2). The vacancy
covariates includes: job title, posted educational requirement for the vacancy, whether the
vacancy is permanent or temporary, date that vacancy was posted and whether the vacancy
is assigned to treatment or control. Finally we observe two (binary) outcome variables,
namely whether the candidate is invited for interview, and whether the candidate received
a job offer. Our data set contains a total of 1200 applicants spread over 37 vacancies.
23Before we got access to the data it was anonymized and screened for confidentiality.
15
4.2 Descriptives
4.2.1 Vacancies
Table 1 gives a first look at the data, in terms of the number of vacancies posted in
treatment and control group and the number of applicants. The table is also broken down
on the educational requirements for the vacancies.
During the experimental period 17 vacancies were posted in the treatment group, while
in the control group 20 vacancies were posted. When breaking these numbers down by
educational level required the main difference is that the control group has a slightly
higher number of vacancies for the highest educational level. These differences are not
statistically significant24. Turning to the number of applicants the sample contains a total of
1200 applicants. 663 applicants applied for the vacancies in the treatment group, while 537
applicants applied for the vacancies in the control group. When these differences are broken
down by educational requirements we do see some heterogeneity across treatment and
control in terms of number of applicants and these differences are statistically significant25.
For some posted vacancies several positions are available. Although we do not know the
exact number of available positions per vacancy the number of offers made provide a lower
bound on the number of positions (for all vacancies at least one job offer was made). For
the posted vacancies in the treatment group a total of 20 job offers were made, while for the
control group a total of 36 job offers were made. These differences highlight the importance
of controlling for vacancy specific effects when we proceed to estimation.
Required Number of Vacancies Number of Applicants
Education Treatment Control Total Treatment Control Total
Low 10 11 21 479 356 835
Medium 5 5 10 155 80 235
High 2 4 6 29 101 130
Total 17 20 37 663 537 1200
Table 1: Vacancies and Applicants by Required Education Level
Table 2 provides a closer look at the variation within vacancies across control and treatment
24p = .814 using Fisher Exact test.
25χ2 = 69.47, p = 0.000.
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broken down by educational level required. It is worth noticing that there is substantial
variation in the number of applicants per vacancy (partially explained by the earlier obser-
vation of several openings per posted vacancy). Vacancies at the lower educational levels
tend to receive more applicants. None of the differences, between control/treatment and
within control/treatment are statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test).
Required Treatment Control
Education Applicants Invited Offered Applicants Invited Offered
Low 47.9 .173 .098 35.5 .185 .112
(37.262) (.163) (.152 ) (26.082) (.127) (.108)
Medium 31 .175 .072 16 .223 .093
(39.956) (.106) (.049) (5.788) (.143) (.035)
High 14.5 .338 .101 25.25 .251 .071
(4.950) (.164) (.014) (19.414) (.206) (.055)
Total 39 .193 .091 28.211 .209 .098
(36.418) (.150) (.117) ( 21.984) (.143) (.083)
Notes: Means reported for vacancies with more than 1 applicant. Invitation and
Offer fractions are means of vacancy specific chances. Let j be a vacancy, nj be the
number of applicants for position j and mj the number of invited applicants. Then
µ = ∑Jj=1(mj/nj)/J . Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2: Vacancy Heterogeneity by Required Education Level
4.2.2 Applicant Characteristics
We now turn to describing applicant characteristics. Table 3 presents descriptive appli-
cant statistics for the treatment and control group. The sample is broken down by the
listed educational requirement for the vacancy. In the control group 19% of applicants are
minority workers, whereas the 15% of the applicants in the treatment group are minority
workers. This difference is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney ranksum test, p = .069).
Broken down by required education level, the only significant difference is for low education
vacancies, where a significantly higher fraction of minority workers applied for vacancies
in the control group (22% vs. 17%, p = .079). Turning to gender the fraction of female
applicants are not significantly different for the total sample. In the control group 57%
of applicants are females and 60% in the treatment group. For the low education level
17
the fraction of female applicants are significant larger in the treatment group (76% vs.
69%, p = .025). The modal age for both the treatment and control fall in the age category
30-45 years of age (49% and 40% for the control and treatment group respectively). The
age composition of applicants differs significantly across treatment and control (Pearson
test, p = .003). Conditioning on required education these differences are driven by the low
and middle education requirements (p = .093 and p = .000 respectively). Finally the table
also provides summary information about the level of education of candidates. The modal
education is ”high” in the control group (52%) while middle educational level is modal in
the treatment group (55%). It is worth noting that for the low and middle educational
requirement vacancies applicants tend to have better qualifications than required for the
vacancy, e.g. for the low education vacancies the modal educational level is middle (54%
vs. 64% for control and treatment respectively). Likewise for the middle educational re-
quirement vacancies the modal educational level is high (80% and 54% for control and
treatment respectively). The educational composition of candidates differ significantly be-
tween groups (p = .000). When we condition the sample on the required educational level
the differences across groups remain significant (p = .000, p = .000, p = .067 for low, middle
and high respectively).
Table 4 shows a different break down of the data. In particular the table conditions on
group membership and whether in treatment/control.
Compared to the majority group there is a larger fraction of minority applicants who are
females. Within groups but between treatment/control there is no significant differences
for either of the groups. Turning to the age distribution, there is no difference between
treatment and control for the minority group. For the majority on the other hand there is
a significant difference (p = .018). These differences are mainly driven by differences in the
age composition of candidates for vacancies in the middle education category. Within this
vacancy category the treatment group is significantly more senior (p = .000)26.
The columns invited and offer gives the percentage of candidates invited for interview
and offered a job broken down on group membership and treatment/control. The fraction
of minority candidates invited does not differ substantially between treatment and control;
in both the control and treatment group roughly 9% of the applicants were invited. On
26Table with breakdown per vacancy category not shown. Available upon request.
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the other hand for majority applicants treatment has a significant effect on the fraction
invited. In the control group 16% of majority applicants are invited, while in the treatment
group only 10% are invited for an interview (p = .004). The same differences between the
two groups are visible when looking at the fraction of applicants who receive a job offer.
In the minority group 4% receive an offer in control, to be compared with 3% for those in
treatment (not statistically significant). For majority applicants the fraction offered a job
drops from 7% to 3% when in treatment (statistically significant, p = .002). This suggests
that treatment (if effective) works by lowering the chances for majority workers but not
for minority workers. However since the treatment group has more applicants, the overall
chance of invitation has decreased, but this does not take into account that there was on
average more applicants for vacancies in the treatment group (see table 2). We return to
this point later.
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Table 5 gives summary statistics for the second stage of the application procedure, i.e.
those invited for an interview. 77 candidates were invited for interview in the control group
and 63 in the treatment group. The sample contains 18 minority and 122 majority candi-
dates. Conditioning on group membership the difference in distribution of characteristics
between candidates selected for treatment and control groups is small. The age distribu-
tions do not differ significantly between treatment and control for either group. Turning
to education for majority candidates there is a discernible difference (p = 0.067) between
treatment and control. This is driven by vacancies in the middle education requirement
range, where the control group candidates have a higher level of education compared to
candidates in the treatment group (p = 0.046, table not shown). The fraction of female
candidates invited for interview in the minority group is 67% in the control and 44% in
treatment. The fraction for majority candidates are 56% and 63% in the control and
treatment group (not significant).
Finally we look at the (conditional) offer rate. Around 44% of minority candidates in
the control group received an offer, while 33% of their treatment counterparts received an
offer (not significant). 47% of majority candidates in the control and 32% in the treatment
group received an offer (significant, p = 0.0825).
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4.2.3 The Effect of Treatment: Empirical CDFs
In appendix A we introduce a simple model for the decision to interview. The model has a
number of predictions about recruiter behavior in the control and treatment condition. In
particular when an employer has group based beliefs about the match quality she should
set different group standards. If the employer has positive stereotypes about one group
relative to the other group, then she optimally sets lower standards for members of that
group.
The goal of an anonymous application policy is to make the interview decision inde-
pendent of group membership (all other characteristics being equal). It seeks to achieve
this by masking the group identity of candidates. When AAP is effective the employer
uses a single standard by which she judges all candidates. This single standard, is between
the two group based standards that the recruiter sets when she can condition on group
membership: smaj < s¯ < smin. The model therefore predicts a particular pattern in response
to treatment viz-a-viz control. We now briefly investigate these prediction by looking at
the empirical CDF’s for the fraction of invitees of both groups and the composition of the
pool of interviewees.
Figure 2 shows the empirical CDF for the chance of a majority candidate to be invited
for interview. The unit of observation is a vacancy and for each vacancy the fraction of
majority candidates invited is the measure used to rank the observation. The plotted
distributions do not control for any heterogeneity across treatment and control, e.g. in
vacancy and candidate specific covariates. The figure contains two panels. Each panel
contains two graphs, one CDF for the control and one for the treatment group. In the left
panel all vacancies are used in computing the CDF. In the right panel we have excluded
those observations where all majority candidates were invited. The right hand panel may
be more informative since for vacancies where all majority candidates are invited we cannot
identify the group specific standard used.
The empirical CDF cannot be ordered (e.g. by FOSD). However there is evidence of a
treatment effect. In particular by and large when under treatment the chances of majority
candidates to be invited for interview are lower than those of the control group. This is
compatible with tougher standards for majority candidates when under treatment.
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Left Panel: Empirical CDF of majority candidates invited for interview. Right Panel:
Empirical CDF of majority candidates invited for interview excluding vacancies where all
majority candidates invited.
Figure 2: Empirical CDF: Majority Invites
Figure 3 is similar to figure 2 except that it looks at minority candidates. As with the
previous figure the right hand panel excludes vacancies where only minority candidates
were invited. The model prediction is that the chances of minority candidates improves
when under treatment, since the recruiter must set a common standard for all candidates.
The right hand panel distributions is in accordance with this prediction. Notice also that
for about 60% of vacancies no minority candidates are invited. Again since we do not
condition on the observables of candidates and vacancies, the graphs are at best suggestive
of an effect of treatment.
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Left Panel: Empirical CDF of minority candidates invited for interview. Right Panel:
Empirical CDF of minority candidates invited for interview excluding vacancies where all
minority candidates invited.
Figure 3: Empirical CDF: Minority Invites
Figure 4 looks at the distribution of the vacancy specific compositions of the interview
pool. The figure therefore to some extent summarizes the information from the two previous
figures. The left hand panel are based on all vacancies, and the right hand panel is based
only on vacancies where both minority and majority candidates applied for the position.
Both panels show the minority share of invites in the interview pool. The panels tell a
similar story. Treatment seems to shift the distribution to pools with a larger minority
share of invites. This is compatible with the evidence of the two previous figures.
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Left Panel: Empirical CDF of fraction of minority candidates in interview pool. Right Panel:
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both minority and majority applicants included.
Figure 4: Empirical CDF: Minority Share of Invites
4.3 Estimands and Identification
We are primarily interested in the following set questions: (1) Is there evidence of dif-
ferential treatment in the interview decision, and if so is the size of the effect economi-
cally relevant? (2) If the answer to (1) is in the affirmative, is the anonymous applicant
procedure successful in eliminating differential treatment? (3) Is there any evidence of
differential treatment in the offer decision? This last question is of considerable interest
given the current state of the literature. As outlined in the literature section there is a
considerable number correspondence studies that find evidence of differential treatment in
the decision to interview. Because these studies typically rely on fictitious candidates they
can (by construction) only provide evidence on the interview decision and not on the job
offer decision.
Before proceeding to testing for potential treatment effects it is useful to define the
estimands and discuss identification. For our setting it is natural to use the potential
outcomes framework (e.g. Imbens and Wooldridge 2009) to phrase our questions about the
estimands of interest.
For each individual i, i = 1, ...,N we define two potential outcomes Yi(0) and Yi(1).
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Outcome Yi(0) is the outcome individual i would experience if she is not exposed to treat-
ment, similarly Yi(1) is the outcome she would experience if exposed to treatment. We
only observe individual i in or out of treatment so one of the outcomes is a counterfactual
outcome. Let Wi be an indicator that takes on the value 1 if i is treated and 0 otherwise.
Then we can write the observed outcome Yi:
Yi = Yi(0)(1 −Wi) + Yi(1)Wi
Our interest centers around the population average treatment effect (or some conditional
version there of): E [Yi(1) − Yi(0)]. The ”problem” with this expression is that we never
observe both outcomes for the same individual. To see how we get identification from
notice that we can write this expression:
E [Yi(1) − Yi(0)] = P (Wi = 0)E [Yi(1) − Yi(0)∣Wi = 0]+(1 − P (Wi = 0))E [Yi(1) − Yi(0)∣Wi = 1]= P (Wi = 0) (E [Yi(1)∣Wi = 0] −E [Yi(0)∣Wi = 0])+(1 − P (Wi = 0)) (E [Yi(1)∣Wi = 1] −E [Yi(0)∣Wi = 1])
the first and last conditional expectation in the last expression above is unobserved. We get
identification from the experimental design in particular since assignment is independent
of potential outcomes: Wi upmodels (Yi(1), Yi(0)) for all i, which implies that E [Yi(j)∣Di = 0] =
E [Yi(j)∣Di = 1], j = 0,1, so that we may write:
E [Yi(1) − Yi(0)] = E [Yi(1)∣Wi = 1] −E [Yi(0)∣Wi = 0] (1)
Equation (1) answers the question: what is the effect of treatment on the population of
applicants? Additionally since we are interested in the question how treatment affects the
two groups we can decompose the equation further. Let Gi denote the group membership
of individual i. We set Gi equal to 1 if i is a majority applicant, and 0 otherwise.
E [Yi(1) − Yi(0)] = Pr(Gi = 1)E [Yi(1) − Yi(0)∣Gi = 1]+(1 − Pr(Gi = 1))E [Yi(1) − Yi(0)∣Gi = 0]
where again identification follows from random assignment.
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While the estimands can be estimated directly from sample averages, it will be useful (as
will become clear later) to explicitly model potential outcomes as follows. Suppose that
the potential outcome in the absence of treatment can be written as:
Yi(0) = α + δGi + i
where α ≥ 0 is a constant, Gi denotes group membership, and Gi = E[Yi(0)] − Yi(0), i.e.
the deviation of individual i’s outcome from the population average. Suppose in addition
that treatment effect is:
Yi(1) − Yi(0) = τ + τ1Gi
This specification assumes constant treatment effect across individuals, but allows for a
group specific treatment effect τ1. The observed outcome is Yi = Yi(0)(1 −Wi) + Yi(1)Wi.
Substituting yields the regression equation:
Yi = α + δGi + τWi + τ1GiWi + i
4.4 Estimates of Unconditional Average Treatment Effects
Here we present raw estimates of the treatment effects without correcting for covariates,
and other features of the data.
Table 6 looks at the interview decision. The table is broken down by group membership
and further broken down by the educational requirements of the vacancy. For the full sam-
ple of majority applicants 15.7% of those in the control group reached the interview stage
as opposed to 9.6% in the treatment group. This difference is significant at the 1% level
(p=.0038). Decomposing further on educational requirement we see that the treatment ef-
fect is negative for the low and mid level vacancies (673 and 207 observations respectively)
whereas its positive for high level jobs (114 observations). For minority candidates the
estimated average treatment effect is small and insignificant. 8.7% of minority candidates
in the control group reached the interview stage, whereas 8.8% in the treatment group
reached the interview stage.
In table 7 the outcome variable is whether the applicant receives a job offer or not.
The sample consists of all applicants. 7.4% of majority applicants in the control group
receive a job offer, while 3% in the treatment group receives an offer. The treatment effect
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Group
Education Entry Interview
Requirement Control Treatment Difference
Majority
Low .1408 .0833 -.0575**
Middle .2462 .0915 -.1546***
High .1429 .3478 .2050**
Total .1570 .0963 -.0608***
Minority
Low .0633 .0723 .0090
Middle .2 .1538 -.0462
High .1 .1667 .0667
Total .0865 .0882 .0017
Notes: p-value for test of equal proportions. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Table 6: Estimated Average Treatment Effects on Interview Invitation. Conditional on
Group and Job Requirement.
is significant at the 1% level (p= .0016). Turning to the minority candidates there is no
evidence of an effect of treatment.
Group
Education Entry Offer
Requirement Control Treatment Difference
Majority
Low .0794 .0253 .0542***
Middle .0923 .0352 .0571*
High .0440 .0870 -.0430
Total .0739 .0303 .0436***
Minority
Low .0380 .0241 .0139
Middle .0667 0 .0667
High 0 .1667 -.1667
Total .0385 .0294 .0090
Notes: p-value for test of equal proportions. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Table 7: Estimated Average Treatment Effects on Offer Decision. Conditional on Group
and Job Requirement.
Table 8 presents estimates of some key parameters of interest. For each outcome of
interest (interview invitation and job offer) the table presents estimates for δ, the extent
of differential treatment in the absence of intervention, and τ1, the group specific effect
of treatment27. The estimate of δ is obtained as the difference in the sample averages
27Estimates are obtained from OLS on the full sample using robust standard errors to correct for the
30
between the two groups conditional on being in the control. In addition τ1 is estimated,
as a difference-in-difference between treatment effects conditional on group membership.
Based on these raw estimates (which does not control for covariates) the estimate
of differential treatment in favor of the majority group is 7.1% (p=.031). There is no
statistically significant evidence of a differential treatment effect (p=.164), but the point
estimate is -6.3%. Turning to the offer decision the differential treatment at the interview
stage maps into a higher offer rate for the majority group, the point estimate is 3.5%, but
is not statistically significant (p=.119).
Decision Parameter Estimate
Interview
δ .0705**
τ1 -.0625
Offer
δ .0354
τ1 -.0346
Notes: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Table 8: Estimate of group difference in control condition (δ) and group specific treatment
effect (τ1).
4.5 Regression Estimates
The raw estimates presented above ignore several features of the data. First, applicants
decide which vacancy to apply for. Although applicants cannot condition their application
decision on whether the vacancy is in the control or treatment group, as this is hidden
to them, characteristics may differ systematically between groups. A particular concern
is that the difference in success rates in the control condition may be due to majority
candidates being better qualified. Note however that this is unlikely to be the case as
success rates in landing an interviews is roughly equalized in the treatment condition.
Specifically if the majority group is better qualified we would expect this to also be present
in the treatment condition.
Second, in the framework introduced above we assumed that the potential outcome in
the control group is constant across vacancies: Yi(0) = α + δGi + i. This is unlikely to
heteroskedasticity due to the outcome variable being binary.
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be satisfied in our sample as different vacancies may have different likelihoods of success.
Specifically vacancies may have different optimal thresholds as in the model of section A.
A more practical issue is that some vacancies contain several openings. We allow for a
vacancy specific fixed effect, αj, to address these issues.
Finally, the data is clustered in a specific way. In particular within vacancies there
is competition among the applicants for a limited number of interview spots. We would
therefore expect that the success of one candidate negatively affects the chances of another
candidate to succeed in landing an interview. More generally we allow for correlation
within vacancies and cluster errors on the vacancy level.
Using the notation introduced above we model the outcome (interview or offer) of
individual i in vacancy j when i is not treated as:
Yij(0) = αj + βXij + δGi + ij
where αj is a vacancy specific effect, β is a vector of parameters and Xij a vector of
candidate (age, educational attainment, gender, etc.) and vacancy specific variables (and
interactions), and ij is the mean deviation of the outcome of individual i in job j.
With this model for Yij(0) we arrive at the regression specification:
Yij = αj + βXij + δGi + τ1Gi ×Wj + ij (2)
where as before Gi is a group membership dummy which takes the value 1 if i is a majority
member, and 0 otherwise. Wj is a treatment dummy which takes the value 1 if vacancy j
is assigned to treatment and 0 otherwise.
Since we allow for a vacancy specific effect αj we cannot separately identify the overall
effect of treatment (τ).
4.5.1 Estimation: The Interview Decision
The specification in equation (2) readily suggests an estimation procedure. Since the
outcome variable is dichotomous this specification is a linear probability model (LPM)
estimated by OLS28.
28As noted in section 4.2.2 there are 51 candidates with missing information for either their educational
level or their age. We drop these observations from the estimation sample. Accordingly the estimation
sample contains 1149 individuals, applying for a total of 37 vacancies.
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Table 9 presents a series of estimates based on the specification given in equation (2)29.
Model (1) is a basic specification which only includes the group membership dummy, the
treatment dummy and their interaction, and vacancy specific fixed effects. Holding mem-
bership in the majority group increases the likelihood of success by 7.7%. This effect is
significant at the 5% level. Model (2) allows for candidate and vacancy covariates (and
interactions), but does not allow for vacancy specific effects. Not all parameter estimates
are reported, but those for gender and age are presented since some empirical literature
has identified differential treatment based on gender and age. We do not find evidence of
such discrimination. Introducing covariates improves the precision of the estimate for dif-
ferential treatment (significant at 1% level). The size of the effect is similar (8.2%). In this
specification there is also (weak) evidence that the two groups are affected differentially
by treatment (10% level). Finally model (3) allows for vacancy specific effects and covari-
ates. This specification subsumes some of the vacancy specific covariates which cannot be
separately identified as they are constant within a vacancy.
In the last row of the table we report the p-value for the test H0 ∶ δ + τ1 = 0. In all
specifications the policy is successful in the sense that we cannot reject that treatment
succeeds in creating equal chances.
A potential concern when interpreting results is omitted variables. Our data only con-
tain a limited set of covariates. Recruiters will have more detailed available to them when
making a decision whether to interview or not. The application package for a candidate
includes a cover letter and a detailed resume, whereas we only have access to a few can-
didate characteristics. It is plausible that these characteristics (unobserved to us) are
systematically different between groups. E.g. the population of majority members have
a stronger labor market attachment, and thus one would expect that the population of
majority members have more labor market experience and perhaps better references. Such
characteristics are a strong signal of productivity. If this population statement is also true
for the population of applicants then, since we cannot condition on these variables, this
29Appendix C compares this specification with estimates obtained from a probit and fixed effects probit
specification. Estimated marginal effects and significance levels remain stable relative to the LPM model.
In addition we also tried a specification that allows for heterogeneous effects based on the educational
requirement of the job, which we return to in section 5. We found no evidence of differences in differential
treatment based on job categories (available upon request).
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correlation will be picked up by the group membership variable. This concern is unlikely
to be the driver of our results. Recruiters in the treatment condition also have access to
detailed information on labor market experience, but group membership is hidden. Thus
we would expect to find that group membership matters for the selection decision also in
the treatment condition. As it turns out there is no evidence of differential treatment in
the treatment condition. Thus at least for the present sample omitted variables correlated
with group membership cannot be the driver of the results.
Dependent Variable: Interview
(1) (2) (3)
Majority (δ) 0.0765** 0.0818*** 0.0873***
(0.0317) (0.0263) (0.0300)
Majority×Treatment (τ1) -0.0575 -0.0649* -0.0556
(0.0408) (0.0365) (0.0398)
Female 0.0155 0.0398
(0.0219) (0.0250)
Age 30-45 0.0243 0.0328
(0.0257) (0.0244)
45-65 -0.0451 -0.0314
(0.0312) (0.0319)
Observations 1,149 1,149 1,149
Clusters 37 37 37
Job FE YES NO YES
Matchspecific Controls NO YES YES
R-squared 0.119 0.058 0.151
δ + τ1 = 0 (p-value) 0.462 0.522 0.273
Notes: Clustered standard errors (per vacancy) in parentheses.
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Excluded age category is < 30 years of
age. Model (2): 12 observations with predicted probability less than 0.
No observations with predicted probability greater than 1. Model (3): 5
observations have a predicted probability less than 0. No observations
with a predicted probability greater than 1.
Table 9: LPM estimates for Interview Decision
To put the estimated coefficients (from model (3)) in perspective we fix characteristics
at their sample means. A minority candidate with average characteristics in the control
group has a likelihood of success of 7.3%. Their majority counterpart has a chance of
34
success of 16%. Thus while a minority candidate would expect to send around 13-14
applications before landing an interview the majority candidate can expect to send only 6
applications.
4.5.2 Estimation: The Offer Decision
The estimates for the decision to interview confirm that group membership plays a signif-
icant role for the success of candidates in landing an interview. We now look at the job
offer rates.
The regressions reported in table 10 are identical to those reported for the interview
decision outcome above, except that the outcome (dependent) variable is a binary indicator
of whether the candidate was offered a job or not.
Model (1) includes only the group dummy, it’s interaction with the treatment and
the vacancy specific effects. The point estimate of differential treatment is 2.9% but the
effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels. In model (2) we leave out the
vacancy specific effects but introduce candidate and job-covariates. The point estimate of
differential treatment in this specification is 4.2% and it is statistically significant at the
5% level. Model (3) adds vacancy specific effects. The point estimate now drops to 3.7%
and is no longer significant at conventional levels. In terms of fit model (2) and (3) for
the offer decision has a relative large number of candidates for which the model predicts
probabilities below 030.
In sum we find only weak evidence of differential treatment in unconditional offer rates.
Taken together with the evidence of differential treatment in the interview decision these
results are compatible with minority candidates being held to a higher standard in the
interview decision, but conditional on making it to the interview stage minority candidates
perform better than their majority counterparts. In the light of differential treatment at the
interview stage one would indeed expect the pool of minority candidates to be on average
better qualified than the interview pool of majority candidates, which should translate into
higher offer rates. Due to the relatively low sample size of candidates making it to the
interview stage the data does not allow us to precisely estimate this effect (regressions for
30In appendix C we fit a probit model to the data. In some of these specifications the majority indicator
is significant at the 10% level.
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the pool of applicants who make it to the interview stage can be found in Appendix B).
Dependent Variable: Job Offer
(1) (2) (3)
Majority (δ) 0.0286 0.0415** 0.0365
(0.0249) (0.0200) (0.0239)
Majority×Treatment (τ1) -0.0280 -0.0339 -0.0279
(0.0294) (0.0248) (0.0285)
Female 0.00271 0.0123
(0.0154) (0.0176)
Age 30-45 0.00586 0.00778
(0.0152) (0.0147)
45-65 -0.0253 -0.0260
(0.0166) (0.0181)
Observations 1,149 1,149 1,149
Clusters 37 37 37
Job FE YES NO YES
Matchspecific Controls NO YES YES
R-squared 0.083 0.042 0.102
δ + τ1 = 0 (p-value) 0.969 0.616 0.599
Notes: Clustered standard errors (per vacancy) in parentheses.
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Excluded age category is < 30
years of age. Model (2): 77 observations with predicted probabil-
ity less than 0. No observations with predicted probability greater
than 1. Model (3): 83 observations have a predicted probability
less than 0. No observations with a predicted probability greater
than 1.
Table 10: LPM Estimates Offer Decision. Full Sample.
4.6 Which Discrimination?
Does the experiment allow us to shed light on which theory of differential treatment better
is in line with our results?
Two prominent (general equilibrium) economic theories of group based differential
treatment exist. The animus-based theory due to Becker (1957) assumes that a recruiter
has a taste for discrimination. The taste may come from a pure dis-taste of hiring mi-
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nority members or a taste for hiring majority members (or more generally the recruiter
may internalize dis-taste from her current employees). In the other prominent theory the
source of differential treatment is informationally based (Arrow 1973, Phelps 1972). Be-
cause recruiters cannot observe all relevant productivity characteristics at the application
stage they may form stereotypes based on group membership.
The present experiment is not specifically designed to distinguish between these two
theories. In a recent paper List (2004) used a field experiment coupled with lab experiments
on the same population. His setting, unlike ours, is trade at sport cards fares where
in addition to taste based and statistical discrimination, also differences in bargaining
techniques may explain different group outcomes. List finds overwhelming support for
the predictions of statistical discrimination. He is able to uncover that different consumer
groups have different value distributions, and that experienced sellers are aware of this and
use this knowledge to third degree price discriminate buyers. We are not aware of studies
similar studies in a labor market setting. Returning to the present setting the fact that the
recruitment procedure is a two-step procedure, and that we observe how recruiters behave
in frames where they can observe group memberships and when they cannot (until the
interview stage) allow us to make some indirect inference about which of these theories is
more consistent with observed recruitment decisions.
The control group behavior cannot be used to distinguish between the theories, as
both would predict that minority candidates are held to a higher standard. In the animus
based theory better productivity characteristics of a minority candidate compensates the
employer for her dis-taste of minority members. In the informationally based theory higher
standards for the minority group is set since employers believe that the group on average
is less qualified than the majority group. A minority applicant therefore needs to be more
convincing to land an interview.
Behavior in the treatment condition is more in line with an informationally based theory
of differential treatment. In particular equally qualified candidates face the same chances
of landing an interview in the treatment condition, but also at the second stage there is no
evidence of differential treatment. Table ?? in the appendix contains regression results for
the offer decision conditional on reaching the interview stage. The point estimate for the
effect of group membership actually goes in the direction of an advantage to being a minor-
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ity member, but the effect is not statistically significant. Under an animus-based theory we
would expect discrimination at the offer stage in the treatment group. If recruiters cannot
express their taste at the first stage of the application procedure they are able to do so at
the interview stage. On the other hand a theory based on statistical discrimination would
predict that the information contained in group membership is used at the first stage to set
tougher standards for minorities. Therefore at the interview stage where all information
is revealed we would not expect group membership to matter for predicting receipt of an
offer.
Some of our results are somewhat puzzling. E.g. we observe that majority membership
confers an advantage for the interview decision, but no such advantage is identified for
unconditional job offers. If recruiters used information optimally (in particular information
on group membership), at the interview decision stage, we would expect that conditional
on getting an interview no differences be detected between groups. This suggests that
minority candidates are penalized ”too much” based on group membership in the interview
decision. Thus the differential treatment that we observe seems partially to reflect recruiters
knowledge of the distribution of unobserved (at the application stage) characteristics and
the optimal response to this.
5 A Follow Up Experiment
The experimental results appear to us to give strong and conclusive evidence about dif-
ferential treatment in the decision to interview based on the classification of applicants
into minority and majority membership. Interestingly this differential treatment does not
translate into differential treatment in job offers.
The policy maker’s stated pre-experimental objective was to: ”examine if minori-
ties have a higher chance to be invited for interview under an anonymous application
procedure”(Gemeente Nijmegen 2008, p.3). Thus the policy maker was first and foremost
concerned whether a ”bias” was present in the first stage of the application procedure.
Whether differential treatment was present for the decision to offer a job did not enter
explicitly into the policy maker’s objective. The method of evaluation of the experimental
data differed from the one we have employed here. To be specific the success of the policy
was evaluated by comparing the percentage of minority (majority) applicants invited for
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an interview under treatment and control.
Under the policy makers evaluation method significant levels of differential treatment
were identified. In spite of this concerns were raised about reliability. The following quote
(translated from Dutch) illustrate some of these (ex-post) concerns (published in March
2007):
When evaluating the first experiment we find that applicant characteristics such
as age, gender and educational level does not, in a statistical sense, contribute
to explaining which candidates are invited. It could be that subjective factors
played a role when recruiters select candidates. We are thinking of differences
in the way letters are assessed such as preferences for a certain letter style,
references provided in the letter, and preferences for candidates based on (un)-
conscious stereotyping . Moreover the results could be due to chance, maybe the
difference would also have occurred in the absence of an experiment. Finally,
it may be that recruiters paid more attention to the ethnicity of the candidate
because of the experiment. (Gemeente Nijmegen 2008, p.4-5)
In April 2007 it was decided that a follow up experiment to test the reliability of the
first experiment be conducted. The follow up ran from 1st of May 2007 until 1st of January
2008, and involved the same departments as in the first experiment. The twist was that
the former control group would become the treatment group and vice versa (it was still
not made public which departments had been assigned to treatment control in the first
experiment).
This follow up experiment provides us with an opportunity to understand how recruiters
respond to the announcement. Before proceeding it is worthwhile to raise a number of ex-
ante concerns about the interpretation of a follow up experiment on the same population.
A main concern is that those that were treated in the first experiment become the control
in the second experiment. If recruiters, and particularly recruiters in the former treatment
group, take the participation in an experiment as a signal of the objective function of the
council then at least one would expect that a sophisticated manager could surmise that
his/her decisions would be monitored. Decisions that are not aligned with the principal
may therefore lead to sanctions.
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An interesting feature of the follow up is that the informational setting has changed. In
particular the method of evaluation has become public knowledge; prior to the first exper-
iment it is not clear that recruiters were aware how their decisions would be scrutinized,
and which method would be used to identify differential treatment. After the publication
of the evaluation of the first experiment it is now clear that the experimental outcome is
evaluated by comparing (unconditional) invitation rates for the two groups. Differential
treatment is present if invitation rates are significantly different in the control condition.
Recall that in the first experiment the invitation rate for the majority group was 16%
and 10% for the minority group in the control treatment. This difference is statistically
significant (p=.032). On the other hand in the treatment condition invitation rates are
10% and 9% respectively (p=.794).
We do not explicitly know the aim of recruiters, but we do know from survey evidence
that many recruiters expressed reservations about the policy measure. In order to avoid the
policy becoming permanent invitation rates in the control treatment needs to be equalized.
How should a recruiter who harbors stereotypes respond to the information that has been
revealed? This question can be analyzed within the context of the interview decision model
we introduced in appendix A. Suppose for concreteness that jobs are created (exogenously)
at two job levels: H(igh) and L(ow); the H job level requires a higher standard being set
in the unconstrained problem. In appendix A.3 we show that in general it is not optimal
to respond to the equal invitation rate requirement by equalizing invitation rates between
groups at each job level. The optimal way to respond depends on two factors. First,
when the share of minority applicants is small, the recruiter responds to the constraint by
distorting standards more for the minority group than for the majority group (i.e. lowering
standards for the minority group and increasing standards for the majority group). This
effect is the standard effect identified by Coate and Loury (1993). The intuition is that
with a small minority share distorting the minority threshold away from the optimum, in
order to meet the constraint, is less costly than distorting the majority threshold, since
the recruiter only bears this cost for a small fraction of the total applicant pool. Thus
the recruiter distorts the minority threshold relative more than the minority threshold.
A second effect that we identify concerns the question regarding at which job level the
recruiter distorts standards relatively more. This turns out to depend on the density of
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applicants around the interview cutoffs. For a fixed distortion in the cutoff the higher
the density of applicants around the cutoff the larger the effect in terms of meeting the
constraint. For example if the density around the L job cutoff is larger than at the H
job, then ceteris paribus the optimal distortion at the L job will be greater31 These two
consideration may lead to heterogeneous effects. In particular whereas the unregulated
solution displays higher cutoffs for minorities at both job levels relative to the tier specific
majority cutoffs, the regulated solution may display a lower cutoff for minorities at the L
level but a higher cutoff at the H level.
To investigate this hypothesis we modify the framework to allow for heterogeneous
effects. The sample contains 3 categories of jobs based on the educational requirement
(”low”, ”middle” and ”high”). Label these r=1, 2 and 3 respectively, 3 corresponding
to the ”high” requirement. Let F rj be an indicator that takes value 1 if vacancy j has
educational requirement equal to r and 0 otherwise. We can then allow for heterogeneous
differential treatment in the control condition as follows:
Yij(0) = αj + 3∑
r=1 δrGiF rj + ij
The treatment effect is modeled as: Yij(1)−Yij(0) = τ0 +∑3r=1 τrF rjGi. Then the regression
equation becomes (ignoring covariates):
Yij = αj + δ1Gi + 3∑
r=2 δrFjGi + τ0Wj + τ1GiWj + 3∑r=2 τrGiF rjWj + ij (3)
In this specification δ1 is a measure of differential treatment in ”low” educational require-
ment jobs, δ1+δ2 is the corresponding measure for ”middle” range jobs, and δ1+δ3 measure
differential treatment in the ”high” range jobs. As before when estimating the model the
vacancy fixed effects subsumes τ0.
5.1 Results from the Follow Up
As noted above the follow up experiment ran from 1st of May 2007 until 1st of January 2008.
The experimental sample contains a total of 48 openings for which 1393 applicants applied.
In the interest of brevity the descriptive statistics of the sample have been relegated to
31A sufficient condition for this is f ′q(θ) < 0. The example in the appendix shows that this condition is
not necessary.
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appendix D. Instead we proceed directly to estimating specifications along the lines of
equations (2) and (3).
Table 11 contains estimation results for 4 different specifications for the interview de-
cision32. Specifications (1) and (2) in the table assumes treatment is constant across job
categories. Model (2) differs from (1) in that we allow for candidate and vacancy specific
covariates. All specifications include vacancy specific fixed effects. Specification (1) is a
simple specification which includes the group indicator and treatment indicator and their
interaction. There is no evidence of differential treatment in this specification. Specifica-
tion (2) also includes candidate covariates and interaction terms between the educational
level of the candidate and the required educational level (labeled matchspecific controls).
Also in this specification there is no evidence of differential treatment. There is some ev-
idence of candidates in the middle age category having an advantage viz-a-viz candidates
below the age of 30. Specification (3) leaves out candidate and matchspecific covariates,
but allows for heterogeneous effects. For job categories in the mid range the estimate of
differential treatment based on group membership is .1052 (p = .0948). For top range jobs
the point estimate increases to .2484 (p = .0171). Specification (4) allows for both hetero-
geneous effects and applicant covariates. Also in this specification significant differences
in differential treatment per job category are present. The point estimate in the middle
job category is .1371 (p = .0949). For the high range jobs the estimate increases to .2435
(p = .0128).
Table 12 presents estimation results for (unconditional) offer decision based on the same
specifications as in table 11. None of the specifications indicate significant differences based
on group membership. Therefore it appears, as it was the case in the main experiment,
that the differential treatment in the interview decision does not carry over to the offer
decision.
6 Discussion
We have presented evidence from a field experiment on the role of group membership in
interview and job offer decisions of recruiters in the public sector. To our knowledge this is
32The estimation sample contains 1324 observations due to missing values on applicant covariates. Es-
timating model (1) and (3), which do not contain covariates, on the full sample yields identical results.
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Interview Decision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Majority (δ1) -0.0180 0.00549 -0.0718 -0.0442
(0.0417) (0.0366) (0.0554) (0.0471)
Majority× (δ2) 0.177** 0.181*
Middle Education Job (0.0829) (0.0925)
Majority× (δ3) 0.364*** 0.288***
High Education Job (0.131) (0.107)
Majority× (τ1) -0.0239 -0.0203 0.0258 0.0303
Treatment (0.0592) (0.0526) (0.0966) (0.0874)
Majority×Treatment× (τ2) -0.166 -0.176
Middle Education Job (0.122) (0.123)
Majority×Treatment× (τ3) -0.382 -0.344
High Education Job (0.247) (0.234)
Female 0.0209 0.0216
(0.0301) (0.0301)
Age 30 − 45 0.0753** 0.0784**
(0.0343) (0.0342)
45 − 65 -0.0498 -0.0457
(0.0362) (0.0363)
Observations 1,324 1,324 1,324 1,324
Clusters 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0.112 0.160 0.116 0.162
Job FE YES YES YES YES
Matchspecific Controls NO YES NO YES
δˆ1 + δˆ2 .1052* .1371*
δˆ1 + δˆ3 .2484** .2435**
H0: Equal Treatment
under AAP (p-value) 0.771 0.975
Notes: Clustered standard errors (per vacancy) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05,
* p <0.1. Excluded age category is < 30 years of age.
Table 11: LPM Estimates for the Interview Decision for Follow Up Experiment. Full
sample.
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Offer Decision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Majority (δ1) -0.0161 -0.00833 -0.0254 -0.0170
(0.0246) (0.0221) (0.0298) (0.0263)
Majority× (δ2) 0.0152 0.0202
Middle Education Job (0.0675) (0.0684)
Majority× (δ3) 0.0930* 0.0731
High Education Job (0.0554) (0.0485)
Majority× (τ1) -0.00389 -0.00165 0.00904 0.0114
Treatment (0.0332) (0.0314) (0.0462) (0.0429)
Majority×Treatment× (τ2) -0.0010 -0.0152
Middle Education Job (0.0810) (0.0799)
Majority×Treatment× (τ3) -0.178 -0.167
High Education Job (0.128) (0.115)
Female 0.0210* 0.0210
(0.0125) (0.0126)
Age 30 − 45 0.0208 0.0212
(0.0156) (0.0156)
45 − 65 -0.0139 -0.0134
(0.0164) (0.0168)
Observations 1,324 1,324 1,324 1,324
Clusters 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0.051 0.066 0.052 0.068
Job FE YES YES YES YES
Matchspecific Controls NO YES NO YES
H0: Equal Treatment
under AAP (p-value) 0.745 0.806
Notes: Clustered standard errors (per vacancy) in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05,
* p <0.1. Excluded age category is < 30 years of age.
Table 12: LPM Estimates for the Offer Decision for Follow Up Experiment. Full sample.
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the first study that credibly estimates the effect of group membership in both the interview
and offer decision.
We find strong evidence that majority membership confers an advantage in reaching
the interview stage. Moreover the effect is sizeable. Correspondence studies have become
popular since they rely on fictitious resumes, and therefore leaves all aspects of the infor-
mation transmitted to recruiters under the control of the experimenter. Market sorting
aside this methodology yields credible estimates of differential treatment. However it can
be argued that the outcome variable of interest is job offers not the interview decision.
An advantage of the present study is that we can also observe this second stage. Perhaps
surprisingly we do not find evidence of differential treatment in the job offer decision. It is
important to emphasize that we do not get this for free. To obtain these estimates we are
giving up substantial control over the information available to recruiters about candidates.
But since we do observe how candidates perform also when recruiters are barred from ob-
serving group membership, it seems at least in the present sample that no biases have been
introduced as a result of this. We find weak evidence that those minority candidates that
are selected into the interview pool have better chances than their majority counterparts of
receiving a job offer. This suggests that recruiters place too much emphasis on the group
variable for the decision to interview. However the low sample size implies that such a
conclusion can be at best tentative and certainly deserves more attention.
Turning to the follow up experiment we find evidence that is in line with recruiters re-
acting strategically to the constraint imposed upon them by the principal. Survey evidence
conducted among recruiters identified two main features: (1) recruiters did not believe that
they were discriminating, (2) they were skeptical about the use of anonymous application
procedures. That recruiters are skeptical about anonymous procedures is perhaps less sur-
prising given that they do not believe that they apply different standards in the first place.
We found evidence consistent with the idea that recruiters use preferential treatment in so
far as they can achieve equality in invitation rates.
Although we have emphasized identification of differential treatment, the paper also
contains results of interest to policy makers. In particular the study contains an evaluation
of a particular variant of anonymous application procedures. This procedure seems to
work well in creating equal chances in our sample. While we have identified a clear benefit,
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the policy may also contain substantial costs. An anonymous application procedure hides
pay-off relevant information from recruiters. Recruiters may e.g. respond to this constraint
by having a larger pool of invited applicants which increases resources dedicated to the
hiring procedure. A more noisy first stage may also decrease the quality of the match.
Such effects are likely to show up in the longer term in terms of increased separation
probabilities. While these are interesting questions in their own right they are beyond the
scope of this study.
This experiment is conducted in a particular segment of the labor market, which war-
rants some comments about external validity. This field experiment is carried out in the
public sector. The private market may function differently from the public sector, ar-
guably the private sector may be more disciplined by decisions that do not maximize
profits, although as noted by Arrow (1973) this is a delicate argument. Indeed Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2004) respond to wanted ads from a large number of private firms in
Chicago and Boston, using fictitious resumes. They also identify substantial differential
treatment for the decision to interview in this private sector setting.
Another word of caution concerns the nature of the vacancies. Vacancies in the main
experiment is heavily concentrated at the lower and middle range. Accordingly the main
experiment cannot credibly estimate differential treatment in jobs that require studies at
university level. In the follow up the composition of vacancies is more slanted towards
higher end jobs but as pointed out the nature of the follow up raises methodological con-
cerns.
Many interesting questions remain. E.g. it appears that recruiters place too much em-
phasis on group membership when selecting whom to interview, since we find differential
treatment at the interview stage but not in the full sample job offer decision. Accord-
ingly a minority candidate selected for interview is on average a ”better” match than the
majority candidate. This suggest that part of the differential treatment in the interview
decision is due to a bias in favor of majority candidates. Arguably the two stages of the
application procedure differ substantially in the ease with which a bias can be expressed. A
recruiter sorting through resumes may use heuristics when sorting through a large number
of applications, but devote more effort and attention at the interview stage where typi-
cally an interview committee is present. While our study cannot address the behavioral
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mechanisms behind the experimental results these are interesting avenues to explore.
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A A Simple Model for the Decision to Interview
In this section we present a simple model for the decision to interview. The model follows
Coate and Loury (1993).We show how the model specification lends itself naturally to a
regression interpretation.
A risk neutral employer decides whether to invite candidate i to interview for job j. The
applicant is either a good match (q) or a bad match (u) for the job. The employer cannot
directly observe the quality of the match, but she receives an informative signal, θ, about
the suitability of the candidate for job j. If the match is good then the signal is drawn from
a distribution with density fq(θ), and otherwise the signal is drawn from a distribution
with density fu(θ). Both conditional densities are continuous and have full support on the
real line. We assume that the ratio fq(θ)/fu(θ) ≡ g(θ) satisfies the monotone likelihood
ratio property33. In other words the higher the signal the more likely the candidate is to
be a good match for the job. The employer has belief 0 < pi0 < 1 that the candidate is a
good match. After receiving the signal the employer updates her prior belief using Bayes’
law:
pi∗(θ) = pi0fq(θ)
pi0fq(θ) + (1 − pi0)fu(θ)
To solve for the optimal decision rule we need to specify the payoffs for the employer.
Assume that a candidate who is invited and is a good match yields a payoff of χq > 0 and−χu < 0 otherwise. If the employer does not invite the candidate her payoff is normalized
33This ensures that the employers optimal decision rule is a cut-off rule.
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pi0min
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Figure 5: Optimal Standards
to 0. Thus the candidate is invited provided that:
pi∗(θ)χq − (1 − pi∗(θ))χu ≥ 0 (4)
To see that the optimal rule is a cut-off rule observe that:
pi∗(θ)
1 − pi∗(θ) = fq(θ)fu(θ) pi01 − pi0
which is monotonically increasing in θ. Now note that equation 4 can be rewritten:
pi∗(θ)
1 − pi∗(θ) ≥ χuχq
Thus there exists a unique θ∗, which we call a standard such that the candidate is invited
if and only if she meets this standard, θ ≥ θ∗.
The workings of the model is illustrated in figure 5. The employers prior belief, pi is
on the vertical axis and the standard, s, is on the horizontal axis. For a given prior belief
the curve identifies the standard (θ∗) such that when the candidate ”emits” this signal the
employer is exactly indifferent between interviewing and not interviewing the candidate.
Here there are two different groups a majority and a minority group. The recruiter has
a pair of prior beliefs (pi0maj, pi0min) about the match quality of candidates. In the figure
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0 < pi0min < pi0maj < 1 such that the employer has positive stereotypes about the majority
group relative to the minority group. The model then implies that minority candidates
face tougher standards smin > smaj.
A.1 Anonymous Application Procedures
The model lends itself easily to the analysis of a policy intervention such as the anonymous
application procedures. An effective anonymous application procedure (AAP) forces the
recruiter to having one standard for all groups. How should the employer respond when
she recruits under AAP? Since she can no longer observe group membership she should
assign probabilities based on population frequencies (assuming that the policy itself does
not change the composition of applicants). If she has a pair of prior beliefs (pi0maj, pi0min),
where 0 < pi0min < pi0maj < 1 and the population shares are (pmaj,1−pmaj) then her prior belief
that a randomly drawn candidate is qualified, when she cannot observe group membership
is just the frequency weighted average:
p¯i0 = pi0majpmaj + pi0min(1 − pmaj)
Therefore the population weighted belief is a convex combination of the recruiter’s prior
beliefs about the two groups. As illustrated in figure 5 the optimal standard, when the
recruiter is unable to condition on group membership lies in between the two standards
that the recruiter sets when she is able to condition on group membership: smaj < s¯ < smin.
In words under an effective AAP majority candidates will face tougher standards whereas
the standard applied to minority candidates will be looser.
A.2 Regression Interpretation of the Basic Model
The model for the interview decision can be given a regression interpretation.
In particular after linearizing, and introducing candidate covariates, Xi, we can think
of candidate i generating a score when applying for job j:
y∗ij = p˜i0 + ij
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We do not observe the score but we do get to see the decision:
yij = { 1 if y∗ij ≥ 00 otherwise
When estimating the model we allow for a matching function of the form:
m(Xi, rj) = v(Xi,Xj) + γj
where v(Xi,Xj) is a matching function (potentially fully saturated in candidate and va-
cancy covariates, Xi and Xj respectively) and γj is interpreted as a fixed vacancy specific
threshold. We write:
y∗ij = p˜i0 + v(Xi,Xj) + γj + ij
Finally, it is easy to incorporate different group standards into the specification. This is
modeled by allowing the employer to have different prior beliefs about the likelihood that
a member from a particular group is a good match for the job.
y∗ij = p˜i0 + p˜i0MinDi + v(Xi,Xj) + γj + ij
where p˜i0Min is a coefficient that measures the difference between the prior beliefs of the
recruiter for the two groups, and Di is a minority membership dummy.
A.3 The Recruiter’s Problem under Regulation
This section considers how a recruiter should respond to a regulator requiring that invita-
tion rates are equalized between groups.
Suppose there are two groups A and B. The total measure of population is normalized
to 1, and group A is share 0 < λ < 1. Given prior belief pi the expected profits of using
standard s is: P (pi, s) = pi(1−Fq(s))χq − (1−pi)(1−Fu(s))χu. In the absence of regulation
the problem of the recruiter is:
max
sA,sB
λP (piA, sA) + (1 − λ)P (piB, sB)
The first order condition for si, i = A,B then becomes:
1 − pii
pii
g(sˆi) = r
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where g(θ) ≡ fu(θ)/fq(θ), and r ≡ χq/χu. Since g(⋅) satisfies the MLRP the solution is
unique.
Now consider the case where a regulator requires invitation rates to be the same for the
two groups. Given belief pi and a standard s the fraction of applicants invited for interview
is:
ρ(pi, s) = pi(1 − Fq(s)) + (1 − pi)(1 − Fu(s))
It turns out to be more instructive to pose the problem faced by the recruiter as cost-
minimization problem. The cost of choosing standard sˆ + δ, where we refer to δ as the
distortion, can be written as:
C(δ) = ∫ sˆ+δ
sˆ
[r − 1 − pi
pi
g(θ)] dθ
A first order taylor approximation to g(θ) around sˆ: g˜(θ) ≈ g(sˆ) + (θ − sˆ)g′(sˆ) allow us to
write:
C(δ) = ∫ sˆ+δ
sˆ
[r − 1 − pi
pi
g(θ)] dθ
= ∫ sˆ+δ
sˆ
[r − 1 − pi
pi
(g(sˆ) + (θ − sˆ)g′(sˆ))] dθ
= ∫ sˆ+δ
sˆ
[1 − pi
pi
(sˆ − θ)g′(sˆ))] dθ
Suppose that piA > piB such that in the unregulated solution the standards used for B’s
are higher and accordingly invitation rates are lower. Now consider the regulated solution
which requires that invitation rates are identical across groups.
The recruiters problem can then be written:
min
δA,δB
λ∫ sˆA+δA
sˆA
[1 − piA
piA
(sˆA − θ)g′(sˆA)] dθ + (1 − λ)∫ sˆB
sˆB−δB [1 − piBpiB (θ − sˆB)g′(sˆB)] dθ
subject to ρ(piA, sˆA + δA) = ρ(piB, sˆB − δB)
where ρ(pi, s) = ∫ 1s h(pi, θ)dθ is the invitation rate. We write h(pi, θ) = pifq(θ)+(1−pi)fu(θ)
for the signal density.
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The first order condition wrt δA can be written:
−λ1 − piA
piA
δAg′(sˆA) + γh(piA, sˆA + δA) = 0⇒
−λ1 − piA
piA
δAg′(sˆA) + γ(h(piA, sˆA) + δAh′(sˆA)) = 0⇒
δA = −γλh(sˆA)−1−piA
piA
g′(sˆA) + γλh′(sˆA)
where γ < 0 is the lagrange multiplier. The first line follows from an application of the
fundamental theorem of calculus (part I) and the second line relies on a first order taylor
approximation to h(θ) around sˆA: h˜(θ) = h(sˆA) + (θ − sˆA)h′(sˆA). The corresponding first
order condition wrt δB is:
δB = − γ1−λh(sˆB)−1−piB
piB
g′(sˆB) − γ1−λh′(sˆB)
The smaller the share of B’s in the population the larger the distortion to the unregulated
solution for B’s. This is intuitive since a large distortion for B’s is less costly in terms
of foregone profits if they are in a small minority. Also the larger the density the larger
the distortion. This is intuitive since the larger the local density the larger the effect on
invitation rates.
The one tier insights are easily generalized to two job tiers: L and H, where L and H
tier jobs are share µL and µH respectively, µL + µH = 1. Assume rH < rL implying tougher
standards at the high tier. The problem facing the recruiter can then be written:
min
δAL ,δ
A
H ,δ
B
L ,δ
B
H
λ ∑
j=L,H µj ∫ sˆ
A
j +δAj
sˆAj
[1 − piA
piA
(sˆAj − θ)g′(sˆAj )] dθ
+ (1 − λ) ∑
j=L,H µj ∫ sˆ
B
j
sˆBj −δBj [1 − piBpiB (θ − sˆBj )g′(sˆBj )] dθ
subject to ∑
j=L,H µjρ(piA, sˆAj + δAj ) = ∑j=L,H µjρ(piB, sˆBj − δBj )
The first order condition wrt δAj and δ
B
j , j = L,H becomes:
δAj = −γλh(sˆAj )−1−piA
piA
g′(sˆAj ) + γλh′(sˆjA)
δBj = − γ1−λh(sˆBj )−1−piB
piB
g′(sˆBj ) − γ1−λh′(sˆBj )
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The ratio of the distortions for group B can then be written:
δBL
δBH
= h(sˆBL)
h(sˆBH) −
1−piB
piB
g′(sˆBH) − γ1−λh′(sˆBH)−1−piB
piB
g′(sˆBL) − γ1−λh′(sˆBL)
Thus if group B is relatively more populous around the lower tier standard than at the
higher tier standard the distortion at the lower tier will be larger. This would be the case
for instance if h(θ) is monotonically decreasing.
Example - Two Tiers, Linear Signaling Technology Consider the following signaling tech-
nology. Signals are distributed on the [0,1] interval. A qualified candidate draws from
fq(θ) = 2θ, and unqualified candidates draw from fu(θ) = 2(1 − θ). Prior beliefs are(piA, piB) = (.3, .1), and job characteristics are fixed at (rL, rH) = (2/1,3/6). Finally(µL, µH) = (.8, .2). Figure 6 illustrates the unconstrained solution.
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Figure 6: Unconstrained optimal standards. (piA, piB) = (.3, .1), and (rL, rH) = (2/1,3/6).
The constrained solution requires that the recruiter achieves equal invitation rates
across groups. Figure 7 illustrates the solution to this problem as a function of the major-
ity share of the population. The two top panels are for group A and B respectively. The
bottom panel illustrates the population wide invitation rate under the constraint.
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Figure 7: Optimal Standards and Promotion Rates under Regulation.
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Offer Decision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Majority -0.0303 -0.0771 0.0149 -0.0491
(0.190) (0.187) (0.156) (0.194)
Majority×Treatment 0.0118 -0.00238 -0.0375 -0.0390
(0.256) (0.290) (0.232) (0.299)
Female -0.0130 0.0211
(0.0996) (0.130)
Age 30-45 -0.0662 -0.0900
(0.119) (0.153)
45-65 -0.183 -0.214
(0.138) (0.188)
Observations 137 137 137 137
R-squared 0.025 0.261 0.092 0.304
Job FE NO YES NO YES
Matchspecific Controls NO NO YES YES
δ + τ1 = 0 (p-value) 0.914 0.721 0.898 0.706
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05,
* p <0.1
Table 16: Offer Decision. Interview Sample.
C Robustness
The choice of the linear probability model for estimation is a choice of convenience. This
raises the question whether our estimates are robust to more standard approaches to dis-
crete choice. In this section we show that our results are essentially robust to such al-
ternative specifications. We present estimates from two different specifications. The first
specification is standard probit without job level fixed effects. In the second specification
we introduce job level fixed effects. No known consistent estimator exists in the latter
case (Greene, 2001)34. This problems is the more serious the fewer applicants there are.
34Unlike the linear case de-meaning does not get rid of the fixed effects in the likelihood function. This
method thus suffers from the incidental parameter problem since the number of parameters increase with
the number of jobs.
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Simulations reported in Greene (2001) suggest however that the problem is less severe for
Tj > 10, and so for this specific application the problem seems to be less severe. Approaches
exists that allow consistent estimates of the coefficients, but since these methods involves
”averaging” out the fixed effects, the fixed effects are not estimated and we can accord-
ingly not calculate marginal effects or average partial effects which are of great interest
here. Alternatively we could opt for a random effects specification. Such estimates are only
consistent if the effect is not correlated with the explanatory variables, something which
does not seem plausible in our setting.
Invited for Interview
Model LPM (+FE) Probit Probit FE
ME ME APE ME APE
Majority 0.0873*** 0.0663*** 0.0808*** 0.0635*** 0.0849***
(0.0300) (0.0209) (0.0308) (0.0164) (0.0290)
Majority×Treatment -0.0556 -0.0661* -0.0678* -0.0556 -0.0593
(0.0398) (0.0395) (0.0409) (0.0383) (0.0413)
Female 0.0398 0.0229 0.0236 0.0367* 0.0399*
(0.0250) (0.0206) (0.0216) (0.0199) (0.0223)
Age 30-45 0.0328 0.0235 0.0236 0.0291 0.0303
(0.0244) (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0232) (0.0239)
45-65 -0.0314 -0.0458 -0.0493 -0.0276 -0.0305
(0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0364) (0.0304) (0.0353)
Education Middle 0.0316 0.0473 0.0477 0.0413 0.0433
(0.0247) (0.0378) (0.0381) (0.0310) (0.0325)
High -0.00496 0.0468 0.0462 0.0149 0.0155
(0.0300) (0.0437) (0.0420) (0.0351) (0.0363)
Observations 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148
R-squared 0.146 - - - -
Job FE YES NO NO YES YES
lnL0 - -419.8 -419.8 -417.7 -417.7
lnL - -393.2 -393.2 -346.3 -346.3
Notes: Clustered standard errors (per vacancy) in parentheses. ME: Marginal Effects, APE:
Average Partial Effects, *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Table 17: Interview Decision. Full Sample.
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Job Offer
Model LPM (+FE) Probit Probit FE
ME ME APE ME APE
Majority 0.0365 0.0270** 0.0385* 0.0189* 0.0308
(0.0239) (0.0113) (0.0200) (0.00986) (0.0204)
Majority×Treatment -0.0279 -0.0289 -0.0326 -0.0186 -0.0244
(0.0398) (0.0239) (0.0269) (0.0220) (0.0288)
Female 0.0123 0.00804 0.00915 0.0105 0.0141
(0.0176) (0.0125) (0.0145) (0.0109) (0.0150)
Age 30-45 0.00778 0.00838 0.00928 0.00465 0.00602
(0.0147) (0.0126) (0.0139) (0.0114) (0.0147)
45-65 -0.0260 -0.0237 -0.0293 -0.0201* -0.0294
(0.0181) (0.0147) (0.0199) (0.0121) (0.0200)
Education Middle 0.0233* 0.0208 0.0230 0.0262* 0.0333*
(0.0134) (0.0197) (0.0216) (0.0151) (0.0187)
High -0.0137 0.00514 0.00570 0.0109 0.0137
(0.0175) (0.0210) (0.0231) (0.0177) (0.0218)
Observations 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148
R-squared 0.086 - - - -
Job FE YES NO NO YES YES
Clusters 36 36 36 36 36
lnL0 - -217.8 -217.8 -217.8 -217.8
lnL - -200.1 -200.1 -182.3 -182.3
Notes: Clustered standard errors (on job level) in parentheses. ME: Marginal Effects, APE:
Average Partial Effects, *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Table 18: Offer Decision. Full Sample.
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Job Offer (Conditional on Interview)
Model LPM (+FE) Probit
ME ME APE
Majority -0.0491 -0.00116 -0.00108
(0.194) (0.173) (0.161)
Majority×Treatment -0.0390 -0.0287 -0.0269
(0.298) (0.251) (0.236)
Female 0.0211 0.0262 0.0246
(0.130) (0.0999) (0.0937)
Age 30-45 -0.0900 -0.0336 -0.0313
(0.152) (0.119) (0.111)
45-65 -0.214 -0.160 -0.157
(0.188) (0.126) (0.131)
Education Middle 0.187 0.0243 0.0227
(0.192) (0.204) (0.191)
High -0.101 -0.163 -0.154
(0.309) (0.225) (0.215)
Observations 136 136 136
R-squared 0.297 - -
Job FE YES NO NO
lnL0 - -91.36 -91.36
lnL - -85.53 -85.53
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ME: Marginal Effects,
APE: Average Partial Effects, *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Table 19: Offer Decision. Interview Sample.
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D The Follow Up Experiment
D.1 Descriptive Statistics
Required Number of Vacancies Number of Applicants
Education Treatment Control Total Treatment Control Total
Low 7 10 17 237 421 658
Medium 13 6 19 319 163 482
High 4 8 12 81 172 253
Total 24 24 48 637 756 1393
Table 20: Vacancies and Applicants by Required Education Level (Follow Up - Full Sample)
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